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THE LAST TWENTY FIVE YEARS OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION? 
Kevin R. Johnson* 
In a pair of much-watched cases decided by the Supreme 
Court in 2003, affirmative action has been vindicated, if not de-
clared alive and well. 1 The decisions, at least for a time, put to 
rest a controversy that raged over the 1990s.2 Since the Court in 
1978 placed its somewhat obtuse imprimatur on affirmative ac-
tion in the famous case of Regents of the University of California 
v. Bakke,3 race conscious affirmative action programs rose and 
later, at least in some jurisdictions, fell. 4 The latest pair of cases 
announced a truce of sorts in the affirmative action hostilities. In 
so doing, however, the Court has virtually guaranteed that the 
debate over affirmative action will rage again in the not-too-
distant future. 5 
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of California at Davis, Mabie/ 
Apallas Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicanalo Studies; Director, Chicanalo 
Studies Program (2000-01); A.B., University of California, Berkeley; J.D., Harvard Uni-
versity. I thank Constitutional Commentary for publishing this timely symposium issue 
and Professors Luis Fuentes-Rohwer and Guy Uriel-Charles for inviting me to partici-
pate. Jack Chin offered helpful comments on a draft of this article. 
I. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
2. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: 
LONG TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY 
ADMISSIONS (1998); RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY (1996); Daniel A. Far-
ber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 893 (1994); Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human 
Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253 (1999); Mark R. Killenbcck, Pushing Things 
Up to Their First Principles: Reflections on the Values of Affirmative Action, 87 CAL. L. 
REV. 1299 (1999); Charles R. Lawrence, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Lib-
eral Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928 (2001); Peter H. Schuck, 
Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (2001). 
3. 438 u.s. 265 (1978). 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 19-31. See generally GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE 
LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TwENTY-FIVE YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON 
RACE AND REMEDIES (2000) (analy.cing affirmative action law over last few decades). 
5. Justice Scalia contended that, because the different results in the two cases rest 
on fact-specific differences in the affirmative action programs, Grutter and Gratz will 
"prolong the controversy and the litigation" over affirmative action. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 
346 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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The Court's decisions in the two University of Michigan 
cases (Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger) -one involv-
ing undergraduate admissions, the other law school admissions-
raise fascinating questions, many of which undoubtedly will be 
addressed in this symposium. This essay considers one issue. In 
Grutter, Justice O'Connor, writing for a majority of the Court, 
bluntly stated the Court's expectation that, although lawfully 
permissible today, affirmative action programs like the one em-
ployed by the elite University of Michigan law school should not 
be necessary in 25 years.6 
The 25-year time limit announced by Justice O'Connor 
grabbed immediate attention.7 At first blush, the Court's pro-
nouncement seemed overly optimistic, if not woefully out of place 
in a judicial opinion. However, well-settled precedent requires 
time limits on affirmative action programs. Supreme Court deci-
sions have repeatedly emphasized that affirmative action pro-
grams to remedy past discrimination are "temporary" measures 
and should be eliminated when no longer necessary.8 Indeed, in 
certain instances, the Court has expressly required that affirma-
tive action programs have time limits.9 A limit ensures periodic 
review of a race-conscious program and that it is maintained only 
if needed or, if warranted, modified to better achieve its goals. 
Despite the caselaw supporting durationallimits on affirma-
tive action programs, the 25 years announced by the Court, 
which came out of the blue in the opinion in Grutter, can be 
criticized. The instinctive reaction of many affirmative action 
advocates was that two-and-a-half decades will not be long 
enough to eliminate the need for affirmative action at elite pub-
lic universities, most of which currently lack many minority stu-
dents desrite having had affirmative action programs in place for 
decades. 1 Racism has existed for centuries in the United States 
and, although the most blatant forms of racial discrimination 
have been declared unlawful, racism's legacy has proven ex-
6. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343; infra text accompanying notes 42-54. 
7. Compare Stuart Taylor Jr., Getting Serious About Race: The Next 25 Years, 
NA T'L J., June 28, 2003 at 2085 (opining that Justice O'Connor's "25-year sunset clause" 
provides universities with "a license to discriminate for another quarter-century against 
Asian-Americans and whites in pursuit of racial balance"), with Shannon Muller, Back-
ers: No Quick End to Affirmative Action, ASBURY PARK PRESS, June 29, 2003, at Al 
(quoting observers skeptical about the possibility that affirmative action would be un-
necessary in 25 years). 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 56-69. 
9. !d. 
10. !d. 
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tremely difficult to remedy. Nor does the nation appear on the 
road to educational equity. A crisis exists in the public elemen-
tary and secondary schools, which are racially segregated with a 
disproportionate number of minority children attending poorly 
financed schools. 11 No cure-all appears on the horizon, much less 
one that seems as if it can be implemented in time to benefit this 
generation of public school students. 
But there is a more fundamental flaw in the Court's expected 
25-year sunset of affirmative action. The Supreme Court accepted 
the affirmative action plan of the University of Michigan law 
school as serving the compelling state interest of ensurinf a di-
verse student body, not to remedy past discrimination. 1 Race 
conscious programs designed to achieve a "critical mass" of mi-
nority students, and a diverse student body, would not seem to 
demand any expiration date, although periodic review might 
make policy sense in order to ensure scrutiny of the results of af-
firmative action programs and to evaluate whether the considera-
tion of race remains necessary to ensure a diverse student body. 
Remedial-based affirmative action, in contrast, would not be nec-
essary after the impacts of an institution's discrimination had been 
remedied. 13 Put differently, universities could still want to strive 
for a racially diverse student body even if an institution's past dis-
criminatory history had been fully addressed, or even if the insti-
tution had never discriminated against racial minorities. 
Moreover, even if one is sympathetic to the notion of time 
limits, an objection to the legitimacy of the Court's 25 year pro-
nouncement exists. The Court arguably should not be in the busi-
ness of establishing the precise limits on the duration of an af-
firmative action program. Political decision-makers, not the 
courts, ordinarily establish time limits, which by their nature ap-
pear arbitrary, such as limitations periods on claims for relief and 
sunset provisions in laws. Such periods reflect a wide variet~ of 
policy judgments best made by legislatures and policy-makers. 4 
11. See Gruller, 539 U.S. at 345 (Ginsburg,J., concurring) (recognizing racial segre-
gation in the elementary and secondary public schools combined with lack of resources in 
schools with high minority enrollments); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298-305 (Gins-
burg, 1., dissenting) (summarizing large racial disparities among various indicators of so-
cial well-being in United States). See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. 
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE 
UNDERCLASS (1993) (analyzing widespread segregation in United States); GARY 
0RFIELD & JOHN T. YUN, RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1999) (finding 
growth in racial segregation in public schools in United States). 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 36-41. 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 56-69. 
14. See Katherine F. Nelson, The Federal "Fallback" Statute of Limitations: Limita-
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The University of Michigan law school, not the U.S. Su-
preme Court, arguably should have provided for periodic review 
of its affirmative action programs-whether remedial or diver-
sity-driven. Without regular review of the program, the argu-
ment goes, the Michigan law school's affirmative action program 
was not "narrowly tailored" to further a compelling state inter-
est, the test applied to racial classifications used by the state. 15 
Along these lines, the argument could be made that the Su-
preme Court lacked the institutional competence to arbitrarily 
create a time limit that is the legitimate province of the political 
branches. 16 In this vein, Justice O'Connor, writing for the major-
ity in Grutter, offered precious little justification or reasoning for 
the 25 year limit, but simply declared it to be. Some might specu-
late that this statement, which is technically dicta, was in the 
opinion as part of a political bargain to build a majority on the 
Court that would leave intact the University of Michigan law 
school's affirmative action program. That tends to lessen, not in-
crease, the legitimacy of the Court's pronouncement that af-
firmative action should no longer be necessary in 25 years. 
This paper analyzes the Supreme Court's statement in Grut-
ter about the expected end of affirmative action. Part I offers 
background on Grutter and Gratz, summarizes the decisions, and 
discusses the debate on the Court over the future of affirmative 
action. Part II analyzes the efficacy of the 25-year limit an-
nounced by Justice O'Connor and the Court's previous emphasis 
on the "temporary" nature of affirmative action. 
I. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION THROUGH 
GRUTTER AND GRATZ 
With grudging approval by the Supreme Court in 1978, af-
firmative action at universities across the United States grew for 
more than fifteen years. 17 In the 1990s, however, some lower 
courts and states wavered in their commitment to affirmative ac-
tion. Race-conscious university admissions programs came under 
tions by Default, 72 NEB. L. REV. 454, 461-66 (1993) (reviewing policy issues balanced in 
selection of limitations periods for claims to relief). 
!5. See infra text accompanying notes 47-49. 
!6. See infra text accompanying notes 70-76. 
!7. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 ("Since this Court's splintered deci-
,i,,n in Bakke, Justice Powell's opinion ... has served as the touchstone for constitutional 
analysis of race-conscious admissions policies. Public and private universities across the 
Nation have modeled their own admissions programs on Justice Powell's views on per-
missible race-conscious policies.") (citations omitted). 
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attack in a number of lawsuits and the political process abolished 
the programs in some jurisdictions. 18 In early 2003, the nation 
anxiously awaited the Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on 
affirmative action. To the surprise of some knowledgeable ob-
servers, the Court ruled that race-conscious admission programs 
that are narrowly tailored to further the compelling state interest 
of a diverse student body could survive strict scrutiny, thereby 
breathing new life into affirmative action. 
A. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SINCE BAKKE 
In the 1978 case of Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, 19 the various opinions of a splintered Supreme Court 
were conventionally read as permitting affirmative action to en-
sure a diverse student body, which Justice Powell championed in 
his opinion in that case.20 Although embraced by major universi-
ties across the country, the diversity rationale for the considera-
tion of race in admissions- that is, that a public university 
should be allowed to consider race in pursuit of a diverse student 
body-has been much-criticized.21 
The other primary rationale for affirmative action- that 
race conscious programs were needed to remedy past discrimina-
tion by the university was not presented by the University of 
Michigan in Grutter and Gratz. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized the propriety of the use of affirmative action to remedy 
past racial discrimination. 22 Some commentators have sought to 
justify affirmative action in public universities in certain states 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 19-31. 
19. 438 U.S.265 (1978). 
20. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-15 (Powell, J.). Justice Powell used the Harvard 
University admissions process as an example of an appropriate diversity-based admis-
sions program that considered an applicant's race among many factors. See id. at 320-24. 
21. See, e.g., Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839 (1996); 
Jim Chen, Diversity in a Different Dimension: Evolutionary Theory and Women's Devel-
opment, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 811 (1998); Richard Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Consti-
tutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 S. Cr. I, 7-15, 21-26; 
Eugene Yolokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2059, 
2070-76 (1996); see also PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA 134-202 (2003) 
(questioning affirmative action as a mauer of sound public policy). For an analysis of the 
justifications for diversity-based affirmative action, see Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action 
in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381 (1998); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, What Exactly is Racial 
Diversity?, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1149 (2003) (book review); Gabriel J. Chin, Bakke to the 
Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS.J. 881 (1996). 
22. See, e.g., Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 509-11 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson 
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,280-83 (1986) (plurality). 
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on the need to remedy their past discrimination.23 However, the 
Court's decisions have made it difficult for government to justify 
an affirmative action program as a remedy absent a clear show-
ing of past discrimination by the particular institution imple-
menting such a program;24 the Court has stated unequivocally 
that "[s]ocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a 
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy. "25 
Since Bakke, the Supreme Court in Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena26 and Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,27 endorsed the 
color-blindness principle-the idea that the law must be color-
blind with respect to race, applied strict scrutiny to racial classifi-
cations in public contracting programs, and held that they violated 
the Equal Protection guarantee. The color-blindness principle un-
dermined the race-consciousness seemingly endorsed by the 
Court in Bakke. Building on Adarand and Croson, the court of 
appeals in the famous Hopwood case held that Bakke did not sur-
vive those subsequent decisions and invalidated the University of 
Texas law school's affirmative action plan.28 Hopwood by itself 
wiped out affirmative action in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. 
23. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, California's Racial History and Con-
stitutional Rationales for Race-Conscious Decision Making in Higher Education, 47 UCLA 
L. REV. 1521 (2000); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Home-Grown Racism: Colorado's 
Historic Embrace-and Denial-of Equal Opportunity in Higher Education, 70 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 703 (1999) [hereinafter Delgado & Stcfancic, Home-Grown Racism]. 
24. See Delgado & Stefancic, Home-Grown Racism, supra note 23, at 712-14 (sum-
marizing law); see, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at498-506 (staling that race preferences in pub-
lic contracting program could not be justified because there had been no showing of dis-
crimination by the city of Richmond). 
25. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276. 
26. 515 U.S. 2lXl, 227 (1995). 
27. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. The color-blindness principle has been much-criticized. 
See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (1991 ); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1060 (1991). In Gratz, Justice Ginsburg expressed disagreement with the require-
ment that strict scrutiny review must apply to race-conscious affirmative action programs; 
she contended that, in her view, "government dccisionmakers may properly distinguish 
between policies of exclusion and inclusion," and subject the latter to more lenient judi-
cial review. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 297, 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted); see also Guy-Uric! E. Charles & Luis Fucntes-Rohwcr, Challenges to Racial 
Redistricting in the New Millennium: Hunt v. Cromartie as a Case Study, 58 WASH. & 
LEE L. REv. 227 (2001) (contending that claims that electoral redistricting impermissibly 
considered race should be reviewed deferentially by the courts). 
28. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., 518 U.S. 
1033 (1996); Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Hopwood, Bakke and the Future of the Diversity 
Justification, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1 (1998). For criticism of Hopwood, sec Tomtko 
Brown-Nagin, A Critique of Instrumental Rationality: Judicial Reasoning About the "Cold 
Numbers" in Hopwood v. Texas, 16 LAW & lNEQ. 359 (1998). In the not-too-distant past, 
the University of Texas law school had engaged in racial discrimination. See Sweatt v. 
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
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Moreover, political movements in some states eliminated af-
firmative action. In California, perhaps the most well known ex-
ample, voters passed a law, Proposition 209 or the "Civil Rights 
Initiative," which ended affirmative action in the University of 
California and California State University systems.29 In the states 
in which affirmative action ended, public universities experi-
mented with race neutral schemes to help ensure a diverse stu-
dent body.30 The most well known experiments occurred in Cali-
fornia, Florida, and Texas, all which adopted percentage 
programs that ensured that the top graduates (Florida (20% ), 
Texas (10% ), California ( 4%)) of each high school in the state 
would be eligible for that state's public universities.31 
In sum, the debate over affirmative action had continued for 
years, with legal and political developments in the 1990s placing 
its future in question. The vitality of the Bakke decision was vig-
orously debated. Rollbacks of affirmative action occurred in 
some states, as the political winds brought challenges to, and 
close scrutiny of, the programs. 
B. 2003: THE MICHIGAN CASES 
Gratz and Grutter, at least for a time, will reinvigorate af-
firmative action at universities across the United States. They 
marked the end of a string of legislative and judicial limits on af-
firmative action and served as an important signal to the nation 
that race-conscious affirmative action was not per se unlawful. 
29. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997) (up-
holding initiative to constitutional challenge); Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San 
Jose, 24 Cal. 4th 537 (2()(Xl) (invalidating public contracting program under Proposition 
209); Conncrly v. State Personnel Board, 92 Cal. App. 4th 16 (2001) (invalidating several 
state programs under Proposition 209). For an analysis of the constitutional deficiencies 
in this initiative, sec Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209,47 DUKE L.J. 187 (1997). 
30. Although upholding the University of Michigan law school's affirmative action 
program, the Court in Gnmer suggested that, in order to end affirmative action in the 
next 25 years, universities look at the results of these and other experiments with race 
neutral programs designed to yield a diverse student body. See Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 343. 
31. The political movement for the Texas percentage plan is discussed as a success 
story of multiracial coalition building and political mobilization in LANJ GUINIER & 
GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY 67-74 (2002). It is not clear, however, that 
such programs have had much of a positive impact. See Cheryl I. Harris, Mining in Hard 
Ground, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2487,2517-38 (2003) (book review); Willliam C. Kidder, The 
Struggle for Access From Sweatt to Grutter: A History of African American, Latino, and 
American Indian Law School Admissions, 1950-2000, 19 HARV. BLACKLEITER L.J. I, 
29-36 (2003). For analysis of the percentage plans, sec Michelle Adams, Isn't It Ironic? 
The Central Paradox at the Heart of "Percentage Plans", 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1729 (2001); 
Jennifer L. Shea, Note, Percentage Plans: An Inadequate Substitute for Affirmative Action 
in Higher Education Admissions, 78 IND. L.J. 587 (2003). 
178 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:171 
By upholding the law school's affirmative action program, 
Grutter may continue to assist a small number of minorities to 
gain admission to law school. Importantly, the cases had emerged 
as the focal point of a national campaign to keep affirmative ac-
tion and to fight the perceived re-segregation of the public univer-
sities.32 The Court's decision in Grutter undoubtedly will allow for 
affirmative action programs to continue at many schools. More-
over, the message of encouragement to people of color was much 
needed after years of attacks on affirmative action.33 
However, the results of the University of Michigan law 
school's affirmative action program may leave doubt about how 
effective it was in ensuring a diverse student body, and, more gen-
erally, place in question the positive impact of affirmative action 
programs. In the fall of 2002, the law school had an entering class 
with a total minority population of about 25 percent, but with no 
Mexican-Americans among its 6.8 percent Hispanics and 6 per-
cent African Americans.34 By comparison, the University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley School of Law had almost 40 percent minority 
students, with African Americans comprising more than 5 percent 
and Mexican Americans over 7 percent of the first year class.35 Al-
though demographic differences exist between the states, both 
Michigan and California pride themselves as elite national law 
schools that draw their student bodies from across the country. 
1. The Legal Test Applied to Race-Conscious Affirmative 
Action 
As summarized by Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, the 2003 
affirmative action cases "adhered to the position articulated by 
Justice Lewis Powell in Bakke a quarter century ago: Diversity is 
a compelling state interest in education and universities may use 
race as a factor to ensure diversity, but quotas or numerical 
quantification of benefits is impermissible."36 In Grutter, the 
Court upheld the University of Michigan law school's program 
that ensured individual review of each applicant's file and al-
lowed race to be considered as one of many factors in the admis-
32. See BAMN- Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action & Integration, and Fight 
for Equality By Any Means Necessary <http://www.bamn.com> (listing various political 
activities). 
33. See supra text accompanying notes 19-31. 
34. See ABA-LSAC, OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 2004 
EDITIOl\ 426 (2003). 
35. See id. at 150. 
36. Erwin Chemerinsky, October Term 2002: Value Choices by the Justices, Not 
Theory, Determine Constillltional Law, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 367,369 (2003). 
2004] THE LAST25 YEARS OFAFFIRMATIVEACTION? 179 
sion decision in the law school's pursuit of a diverse student 
body with a "critical mass" of minority students.37 In contrast, 
the Court in Gratz invalidated the undergraduate admissions 
scheme at Michigan, which relied on a point system with minor-
ity applicants receiving twenty points for being a racial minor-
ity.38 In the Court's estimation, the point allocation based on 
race effectively determined whether or not an applicant would 
be admitted and, as it operated in IJractice, did not constitute in-
dividual review of each application.39 
Grutter and Gratz together refine the requirement that race 
conscious programs must be "narrowly tailored" to further a 
compelling state interest. The Court believed that the individual 
review of each file on its merits as done by the University of 
Michigan law school was the quintessence of narrow tailoring.40 
In contrast, the point system in Michigan's undergraduate ad-
missions scheme that made individual review of the entire file 
almost irrelevant for minority applicants, was not narrowly tai-
lored to further a compelling state interest.41 
2. The Hoped for End of Affirmative Action 
In upholding the University of Michigan law school's af-
firmative action program, the Court in Grutter emphasized that 
race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. 
This requirement reflects that racial classifications, however 
compelling their goals, are potentially so dangerous that they 
may be employed no more broadly than the interest demands. 
Enshrining a permanent justification for racial preferences 
would offend this fundamental equal protection principle.42 
37. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-41 (2003). The Court emphasized 
that deference must be accorded to the university in its exercise of academic judgment. 
See id. at 2339. 
38. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,275 (2m3). 
39. See id. at271-74. 
40. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 ("[T]he Law School engages in a highly individual-
ized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways 
an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment."). 
41. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at306-10. 
42. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (emphasis added); see also id. ("Thl! requirement that 
all race-conscious admissions programs have a termination point ·assure[s] ... that the 
deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary 
matter, a measure taken in the service of the goal of equality itself."') (citing Richmond 
v. Croson, 488 U.S. at 510). The Court noted that the law school had conceded that there 
must be a reasonable time limit on affirmative action programs. See id. (citing Brief for 
Respondents Bollinger eta!. 32). 
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The Court added that "the durational requirement can be met 
by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and 
periodic reviews to determine whether racial greferences are still 
necessary to achieve student body diversity." 
But the Court did not stop, as it had in the past, with gener-
ally expressing the need for an end to race-conscious affirmative 
action. Rather, the Court continued: 
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the 
use of race to further an interest in student body diversity in 
the context of public higher education. Since that time, the 
number of minority applicants with high grades and test 
scores has indeed increased .... We expect that 25 years from 
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to 
further the interest approved today.44 
The 25 year expectation for the end of affirmative action 
was curious, even to other Justices on the Court. In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Ginsburg challenged the limitation: "it was only 
25 years before Bakke that this Court declared public school seg-
regation unconstitutional, a declaration that, after prolonged re-
sistance, yielded an end to a law-enforced racial caste system, it-
self the legacy of centuries of slavery."45 Because of the 
deficiencies in the public education of many minorities in the 
modern United States, she cautioned that "[f]rom today's van-
tage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the 
next generation's span, progress toward nondiscrimination and 
genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirma-
tive action."46 In sum, Justice Ginsburg was considerably less 
certain than Justice O'Connor that the need for affirmative ac-
tion would evaporate within 25 years. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent bluntly contended that 
"the Law School's program fails strict scrutiny because it is de-
void of any reasonably precise time limit on the Law School's 
use of race in admissions. "47 While the majority offers a 25 year 
43. Gructer, 539 U.S. at 342. 
44. /d. at343 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
45. /d. at 345 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Breyer joined 
the concurrence. See id. at 344. 
46. /d. at 346 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Justice Ginsburg stated, how-
ever, that "[t]hc Court's observation that race-conscious programs 'must have a logical 
end point,' ... accords with the international understanding of the office of affirmative 
action." /d. at 344 (citation omitted). Justice Ginsburg thus differed with Justice 
O'Connor about the length of time that affirmative action would be needed. 
47. /d. at 378,386 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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limit, the law school is "more ambiguous" about the existence of 
any time limit,48 which Chief Justice Rehnquist believed was 
constitutionally fatal. Similarly, Justice Kennedy in dissent found 
that "[i]t is difficult to assess the Court's pronouncement that race-
conscious admissions will be unnecessary 25 years from now."49 
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Thomas 
read the majority's 25 year language expansively to "hold[] that 
racial discrimination in higher education admissions will be ille-
gal in 25 years"50 and chastised the majority for effectively sanc-
tioning constitutional violations for at least 25 years.51 To Justice 
Thomas, "[t]he majority does not and cannot rest its time limitation 
on any evidence that the gap in credentials between black and 
white students is shrinking or will be gone in that time frame. "52 At 
the same time, he did not see two-and-a-half decades as sufficient 
time to increase African American representation at the top law 
schools without affirmative action.53 Reading between the lines, 
Justice Thomas's opinion reflects skepticism about, if not disdain 
for, university administrators' race-conscious affirmative action ef-
forts while also seeking to maintain the school's elite status. 54 
The various opinions raise legitimate questions about the 
time limit conjured up by the majority in Grutter. The next sec-
tion analyzes some of those questions 
II. THE LAST 25 YEARS? 
The new 25-year limit on affirmative action, which stuck out 
in the Supreme Court's opinion in Grutter, was widely reported 
48. /d. at 386-87; see infra text accompanying notes 56-69 (discussing cases requiring 
that affirmative action programs have time limits). 
49. /d. at394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
50. /d. at 351 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis added); 
see id. at375 ("!agree [with the majority]that in 25 years the practices of the Law School 
will be illegal . ... ) (emphasis added). Justice Scalia joined most of Justice Thomas's 
opinion, including the discussion of the 25-ycar end of affirmative action. See id. at 346 & 
n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
51. See id. at349 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
52. /d. at 375-76 (footnote omitted). 
53. See id. at 376. 
54. See, e.g., id. at 349-50 ("Like [Frederick] Douglas, I believe blacks can achieve 
in every avenue of American life without the meddling of university administrators.") 
(emphasis added); id. at354-55 & n.3 (rejecting the law school's claimed interest in diver-
sity as interest in a racial "aesthetic"); id. at 355 n.3 ("[T]hc Law School's racial discrimi-
nation does nothing for those too poor or uneducated to participate in elite higher educa-
tion and therefore presents only an illusory solution to the challenges facing our 
Nation."); id. ("[T]he Court upholds the usc of racial discrimination as a tool to advance 
the Law School's interest in offering a marginally superior education while maintaining 
an elite institution"). 
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by the media.55 This section attempts to put the time limit in its 
proper context, while also critically analyzing the sunset provi-
sion. As we will see, the time limit imposed by the Court in some 
ways is consistent with precedent but also raises legitimate ques-
tions of institutional competence. Importantly, the specific limit 
summarily announced by the Court-25 years-also may be sub-
ject to criticism as unrealistic in light of the great difficulties in 
removing the deeply ingrained vestiges of racial discrimination 
from U.S. social life. 
A. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR TIME LIMITS 
The 25-year time limit on affirmative action in some ways 
makes perfect sense. Advocates of affirmative action often em-
phasize that race-conscious university admission schemes are a 
"temporary" remedy. 56 The Supreme Court in the past has made 
it clear that, for programs in which government considered race 
in awarding public contracts in the attempt to remedy past dis-
crimination in public contracting, a time limit was required. In 
Adarand, for example, the Court stated that, in deciding whether 
a minority public contracting program was "narrowly tailored" 
to further a compelling state interest it must consider "whether 
the program was appropriately limited such that it 'will not last 
longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to elimi-
nate."'57 Other decisions of the Court emphasize the "tempo-
rary" nature of race-based programs designed to remedy past ra-
cial discrimination.58 
No less than legendary civil rights advocate Jack Greenberg 
understood the Court's affirmative action decisions before Grut-
ter and Gratz as requiring that race-based programs be limited in 
55. See, e.g., supra note 7. 
56. See, e.g., Adarand v. Pcna, 515 U.S. 200,270 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that affirmative action measures were temporary and would disappear over time). 
57. /d. 515 U.S. at 237 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 513 (1972) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring) (emphasis added)). 
58. See Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989) (stating that race-conscious 
programs are "a temporary matter ... taken in the service of the goal of equality itsciP'); 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion) (disapprov-
ing remedies for discrimination that arc "timeless in their ability to affect the future"); 
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (emphasizing that employer's 
affirmative action program was only "a temporary measure" to correct racial imbalance 
in workforce); see also Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fun-
damental Values with Second-Look Rules of lnterbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1575, 1725-26 (2001) ("[T]hc Court's opinions suggest that the temporary character 
of remedial affirmative action programs may prove determinative of constitutionality.") 
(footnote omitted). 
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time.59 In his view, "[n]arrow tailoring requires that [an affirma-
tive action] program be limited in time .... I am not aware that 
college or university plans include time limits, but they should, 
either by imposing a termination date or requiring periodic re-
views of the need for affirmative action. "60 Greenberg offered this 
opinion before the Court's latest affirmative action decisions. 
Other commentators have suggested the general need for 
time limits on affirmative action programs.61 For example, one 
observer stated that affirmative action programs could be 
deemed "prima facie invalid" if lacking a time limit, which is 
needed to "make the programs subject to regular political review 
and support (or dismantling) and [to] prevent the adoption and 
perpetuation of unexamined set -asides. "62 
Criticisms have been made of Gruffer along these lines. The 
Michigan program arguably should have included some time 
limit for review and reconsideration of the need for the consid-
eration of race, as well as providing a means for evaluating the 
effectiveness of the program.63 By announcing a time limit as 
opposed to requiring the University of Michigan to establish 
one, Justice O'Connor can be seen as stretching the law to avoid 
invalidating the law school's affirmative action program. 
However, time limits are normally associated with affirma-
tive action programs designed to remedy past discrimination, not 
those aimed at ensuring a diverse student body. "Durationallim-
its are conventional and sensible where affirmative action is 
taken to remedy discrimination; remediation is by nature tempo-
ral. A time limit does not, however, well fit enhancing diversity, 
which administers not a remedy but an inherent academic 
59. See Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the 
Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521 (2002). 
60. /d. at 611 (emphasis added). 
61. See Charles F. Abernathy, Federalism and Anti-Federalism as Civil Rights 
Tools, 39 How. L.J. 615 626-30 (1996) (opining that there "must be some time limit" on 
affirmative action programs); Jonathan R. Alger, Unfinished Homework for Universities: 
Making the Case for Affirmative Action, 54 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEM. L. 73, 90 
(1998) (stating that law requires a periodic reevaluation of need for affirmative action 
programs); Schuck, mpra note 2, at 83-84 (stating that affirmative action is generally de-
fended as a "temporary remedy"). 
62. Lisa E. Chang, Remedial Purpose and Affirmative Action: False Limits and Real 
Harms, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 59, 106 (1997). 
63. See Lawrence 1. Siskind, The Preferred Response, LEG. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2003, at 59 
("In the rare instances in the past when the Court permitted racially conscious remedies, it 
generally noted their limited duration. But Michigan's law school made no attempt to show 
that its remedies were time-limited, and Justice O'Connor did not press the issue. She 
merely expressed the expectation ... that 25 years would suffice to sunset the program."). 
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value. "64 Thus, the Court's suggestion of a 25 year time limit 
seems peculiar because it justified the University of Michigan's 
affirmative action program on a diversity rationale, not as a way 
of remedying past discrimination by the University of Michigan. 
If a diverse student body is the justification for affirmative 
action, it is uncertain why the law would require a time limit. 
Durational limits on a university's affirmative action program 
make sense to any affirmative action program only if one be-
lieves, as many proponents do, that remedying past discrimina-
tion really is the true justification for affirmative action, notwith-
standing the claim of public universities that they seek a diverse 
student body.65 The diversity rationale is a way around the re-
quirement that the state must establish a particular history of 
discrimination by the institution, rather than rely on general so-
cietal discrimination to justify race-conscious admissions.66 
As a matter of policy, time limits make sense if one wants to 
ensure periodic review of any affirmative action program. Such 
review ensures that race, a disfavored classification in our consti-
tutional order, is carefully considered and, in fact, necessary to 
ensure a diverse student body. Universities can be criticized for 
not reviewing race-based affirmative action programs to evalu-
ate how they are working. Administrators, faculties, and admis-
sions offices may come to rely on race-based admissions to 
"solve" any diversity issues.67 Consequently, affirmative action 
64. Martin Michaelson, The Court's Pronouncemellls Are More Dramatic and Sub-
tle Than the Headlines, CHRON. HIGHER Eouc., July 18, 2003, at 11 (emphasis added); 
see Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002 Term, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Con-
stillltion: Culwre, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 67 n.306 (2003) ("The time-
limitation requirement announced by Gru//er ... makes theoretical sense only if the justi-
fication for diversity that it announces arc taken to be quasi-remedial"). 
65. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 393 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(stating that various defenders of affirmative action "'readily concede that diversity is 
merely the current rationale of convenience for a policy that they prefer to justify on 
other grounds"') (quoting Schuck, supra note 2, at 34). Student intervenors in the Michi-
gan cases sought to justify affirmative action on other than diversity grounds. See 
Miranda Massie, A Student Voice and a Student Struggle: The Intervention in the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School Case, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 231 (2001). 
66. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25. 
67. See Gru//er, 539 U.S. at 354-55, 369-70 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part) (suggesting that University of Michigan should not be permitted to consider 
race while declining to experiment with other ways of achieving a diverse student body, 
relying on the Law School Admissions Test, and seeking to remain an .elite law school). 
The 25-year time limit in Gru//er thus can be seen as a way of mamtammg pressure on 
colleges and universities to consider alternatives to rac.e-conscious affirmative action. to 
maintain a racially diverse student body. See Neal Devms, Explammg Grutter v. Bollin-
ger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347, 373-81 (2003); Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political 
Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REv. 113, 200-Dl (2003). 
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can become a crutch that renders it unlikely that universities will 
make serious efforts to design and implement alternative meth-
ods for ensuring a diverse student body. One positive response 
to the end of affirmative action in some jurisdictions was the sus-
tained attention paid to formulating alternatives to race-
conscious programs to ensure a diverse student body.68 
In Grutter, as Chief Justice Rehnquist contended,69 the lack 
of any temporal limit to the law school's affirmative action pro-
gram arguably rendered it constitutionally invalid. Despite the 
deficiency, the invalidation of the Michigan law school's pro-
gram on that ground might have been viewed by the public as an 
overly technical way for the Court to reach an ideological result, 
the invalidation of an affirmative action program. If it took this 
route, the Court would undoubtedly have been attacked as act-
ing in a partisan way. 
B. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE OF THE COURT TO 
ESTABLISH AN END DATE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Even if a time limit may be justified, some commentators 
would contend that the limit should be established by the institu-
tion that created the affirmative action program, not the courts. 
The lack of a time limit, or some provision to ensure the periodic 
review of the need for the University of Michigan law school's 
affirmative action program, arguably fails the Supreme Court's 
requirement that race conscious programs must be narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling state interest.70 Moreover, the courts 
are not generally in the business of setting time limits. Legisla-
tures ordinarily create statutes of limitations and sunset provi-
sions in laws, after deliberation, hearings, and debate. The uni-
versity that has established the affirmative action program, not 
the courts, arguably should be required to provide for a period 
for review of such programs. 
This logic has superficial attractiveness. However, there is 
well-established precedent allowing the federal courts to engage 
in a certain degree of lawmaking, including adding limitation pe-
riods to claims under federal laws; even more broadly, the Su-
preme Court has created entire bodies of federal common law 
when it concluded that federal interests so required.71 Specifi-
68. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31. 
69. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48. 
70. See supra text accompanying notes 36-41. 
71. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (federal de-
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cally, rather than allow claims to be brought indefinitely into the 
future, the Supreme Court has willingly created statutes of limi-
tations when a law passed by Congress lacked one. 72 The reason 
for this was the basic idea that every claim must have a statute of 
limitations. 73 
One could approach the issue for affirmative action programs 
lacking a time limit as analogous to the federal law lacking a limi-
tation period on a claim for relief; the argument would be that a 
time limit should be implied in both instances. However, one im-
portant difference between the limitations period cases and the 
time limit in Grutter, warrants mention. In the limitations period 
cases, the Supreme Court "borrows" a limitations period from 
another state or federal law.74 Such a practice tends to circum-
scribe judicial discretion. In Grutter, the Court arbitrarily set a 25-
year limit without discussion of where it came from or offering 
any justification for its selection. Creation of a time period in this 
manner heightens the claim of judicial arbitrariness. This discre-
tionary creation, however, may be equated to the equitable doc-
trine of laches, although a court can be expected to explain its 
balancing of the equities in invoking that doctrine.75 
The institutional competence argument militates in favor of 
invalidating the Michigan law school's affirmative action program 
as not being narrowly tailored because the program lacked any 
time limit. That is certainly one course that the Court could have 
fcnse contractor liability); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) 
(federal labor law); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (federal 
commercial paper). See generally Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 
B.U. L. REV. 895 (1996) (tracing trajectory of federal common law in Supreme Court de-
cisions); Daniel J. Meltzer, Swte Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
1128, 1167-71 (1986) (outlining contours of federal common law). 
72. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 
(1991); Del Costello v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983). For analysis 
of the "borrowing" of limitations periods to fill gaps in federal statutes, see Kevin R. 
Johnson, Bridging the Gap: Some Thoughts about Interstitial Lawmaking and the Federal 
Securities Laws, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879 (1991). To eliminate to a certain extent the 
"borrowing" of limitations periods by the courts, Congress in 1990 passed a law providing 
that a four-year statute of limitations governed any claim under any law enacted after 
December 1, 1990 that lacked a limitations period. See The Implementation Act, Pub. L. 
No. 101-650, § 313(a), 104 Stat. 5114,5115 (1990) (adding 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2000)). 
73. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985) ("A federal cause of action 
'brought at any distance of time' would be 'utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws.' ... 
Just determinations of fact cannot be made when, because of the passage of lime, the 
memories of witnesses have faded or evidence is lost. In compelling circumstances, even 
wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten.") (citation omitted). 
74. See, e.g., id, at 266-68; M'Ciuny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. 270,277 (1830). 
75. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (addressing question 
whether federal court in diversity case would apply federal equitable doctrine of laches 
or state limitations period). 
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taken. However, given its willingness to add limitations periods and 
create entire bodies of federal common law, the pronouncement of 
an expected 25-year sunset, a rather small aspect of Michigan law 
school's affirmative action program, is relatively modest. 
At the same time, by encouraging future litigation, a 25-year 
limit almost ensures the Court's reconsideration of affirmative 
action. This deadline will likely create strong incentives for uni-
versities to carefully craft and meaningfully monitor affirmative 
action programs. The 25-year period ensures the continuous use 
of, and experimentation with, affirmative action programs for a 
time without judicial intervention. Such programs can develop 
and mature, and perhaps improve with periodic adjustments. At 
the same time, the time limit effectively ensures judicial review 
at a later date. Although some, including Justice Thomas, have 
claimed that 25 years, however, is too long a period to "immu-
nize" m.rrowly tailored affirmative action programs,76 others 
contend that it is unrealistic to expect the need for affirmative 
action to end in so short a time. 
C. 25 YEARS AS A REALISTIC TIME LIMIT? 
Some observers might contend that Justice O'Connor's 25-
year time limit on affirmative action is wishful thinking at best, 
and unnecessarily inviting future legal challenges to affirmative 
action programs at worst. A variation of this objection could 
build on the institutional competence argument-that the Court 
selected too short, or perhaps too long, a time period because it 
lacked the competence to have any idea of a realistic period of 
time for the elimination of affirmative action. 77 
Concerns have long been expressed over how long the na-
tion needs the expedient of "temporary" affirmative action.78 
The difficult question is, if temporary, how much time will be 
necessary before affirmative action can be eliminated. In re-
sponse to the suggestion that preferences might not be needed 
much longer, Justice Thurgood Marshall in the Court's delibera-
tions in the 1978 Bakke case, expressed the view that affirmative 
action would be necessary for another hundred years. 79 
76. See supra text accompanying notes 50-54. 
77. See supra text accompanying notes 70-76. 
78. See supra text accompanying notes 56-69. 
79. See Schuck, supra note 2, at 84 n.410 (citing JOHN C. JEFFRIES JR., JUSTICE 
LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 487 (2001)). 
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The racial progress in the last generation does not suggest a 
quick end to the need for affirmative action. Despite Bakke, 
relatively few African Americans and Latina/as currently attend 
colleges and universities in the United States. The status of Afri-
can Americans in terms of income differentials, jobs, and hous-
ing segregation appears little different from 25 years ago.80 The 
criminal justice system has a racial caste quality to it reminiscent 
of the days of Jim Crow, with African American and Latino men 
over-represented in our prisons.81 
The view that affirmative action of the type currently in 
place will not be needed in twenty five years seems wrong on its 
face, at least absent aggressive steps to ensure true diversity in 
university student bodies and radical shifts in student enroll-
ment. As one activist noted after the Court decided Grutter and 
Gratz, '"If all we do over the 25 years ... is affirmative action, 
then we will still need affirmative action."'82 At a bare minimum, 
the crisis in the public schools83 must be addressed before true 
integration of colleges and universities is a possibility. 
Besides the fact that the unfortunate legacy of past dis-
crimination is unlikely to be fully remedied, complications arise 
with respect to various racial groups and the emergence of new 
and different "races. "84 Disputes have arisen, for example, about 
whether immigrants,85 Hispanics,86 and mixed race people should 
80. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
81. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surpl!iS Criminality: Or 
Why the "War on Drugs" was a "War on Blacks", 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 381 
(1997); Cruz Reynoso, Hispanics and the Criminal f!IStice System, in HISPANICS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: AN AGENDA FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 277 (Pastora San 
Juan Cafferty & David W. Engstrom eds., 2000). 
82. Nat Hentoff, Sandra Day O'Connor's Elitest Decision, VILLAGE VOICE, July 
29, 2003, at 30 (quoting Lisa Naverette); see Eugene E. Garcia & Julia Figueroa, Access 
and Participation of Latinos in the University of California: A Current Macro and Micro 
Perspective, 29 Soc. JUST. 47 (2002); Daniel Solonano, el. al, Keeping Race in Place: Ra-
cial Microaggressions and Camp !IS Racial Climate at the University of California, Berke-
ley, 23 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 15 (2002). 
83. See supra text accompanying note & note 11. 
84. For a summary of some of those issues, including the rapidly growing Latinalo 
population in the United States, an increasing overlap between people of color and im-
migration status, and growing numbers of mixed race people, sec Kevin R. Johnson, The 
End of "Civil Rights" as We Know It?: Immigration and the New Civil Rights Law, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1481, 1499-1510 (2002). See generally MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD 
WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1994) (analyzing racial 
formation in the United States). 
85. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 2, at 74-80, 115; Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration 
and Latino Identity, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 197, 207-08 (1998); Peter H. Schuck, 
Alien Rumination, 105 YALE L.J. 1963, 2000-04 (1996) (book review). The Mexican 
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund submitted an amici curiae brief in the 
Michigan cases that argued for affirmative action for Latinalos based on, among other 
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be eligible for affirmative action.87 In the last twenty years, more 
attention has been paid to the difficult issues raised by affirma-
tive action in terms of different racial minorities, with different 
histories and experiences.88 Affirmative action can be seen as not 
only addressing discrimination in the distant past, such as slavery 
and its legacy, but also as directed at more recent, and subtle, 
forms of discrimination 
With affirmative action cut back in recent years, it seems 
unlikely that minority enrollment in public colleges and universi-
ties will turn around dramatically by 2028. Nonetheless, the Su-
preme Court's review of affirmative action might focus attention 
by universities on admissions, a result that the Court might have 
desired. The Court called on universities to investigate alterna-
tives considered in the states that had eliminated affirmative ac-
tion.89 Rather than simply maintain current race-conscious pro-
grams, universities were instructed to seek to improve the 
diversity of their student bodies through race neutral means. 
In this way, the Court's time limit will serve important pur-
poses. Affirmative action arguably has been a crutch relied on to 
ensure a small percentage of minorities, denoted as a "critical 
mass," in the student body, not ensure a truly diverse student 
body.90 Inertia often sets in when university administrators believe 
that they have "fixed" a problem. To attempt to avoid this in the 
future, the Court guaranteed reconsideration of affirmative action. 
Others might contend that 25 years, even if not a sufficient 
time in which to expect the elimination of the need for affirma-
tive action, is too long to ensure a periodic review of its per-
formance at a public university. Careful attention to diversity 
outcomes might assist in fine-tuning and reviewing the outcomes 
of an affirmative action program. Attorneys and administrators 
are familiar with deadline-driven attention to matters. 
things, a history of discrimination in the United States. See Amicus Briefs in Grutter v. 
Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, in Support of the University of Michigan: Brief of Mexi-
can American Legal Defense and Educational Fund eta/. as Amici Curiae, 14 LA RAZA 
L.J. 1 (2003) (reprinting brief). 
86. See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 855,890 (1995); Orlando Patterson, Race by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2001, 
at A27. 
87. See Kenneth E. Payson, Check One Box: Reconsidering Directive No. 15 and the 
Classification of Mixed-Race People, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1233 (1996). See generally MIXED 
RACE AND THE LAW: A READER (Kevin R. Johnson ed., 2!XJ3) (providing various per-
spectives on issues of law and racial mixture). 
88. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 86. 
89. See supra note 30. 
90. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35. 
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CONCLUSION 
The University of Michigan affirmative action cases no 
doubt will be of monumental importance to public universities 
with, or contemplating, affirmative action programs for the fore-
seeable future. The curious 25-year sunset provision imposed by 
the Supreme Court raises many questions, ranging from the 
unlikelihood that the last vestiges of centuries of slavery and seg-
regation will disappear in the next 25 years to the competence of 
the Court to establish a time limit. Because there is no quick fix 
to the legacy of racial discrimination in the United States, the 
elimination of affirmative action in 25 years is problematic. 
However, the Court aptly saw the need for periodic review of af-
firmative action programs and the need to investigate alternative 
means to ensure a diverse student body. New ideas must be ex-
plored as the nation seeks to address the poor representation of 
racial minorities in higher education. 
Whatever the objections, the Supreme Court effectively an-
nounced a tentative 25-year cease fire in the debates about the 
constitutionality of affirmative action. The issue, however, will 
likely arise again. Not long after the Supreme Court decided 
Grutter, some affirmative action opponents advocated political 
movements to eliminate affirmative action, including a possible 
ballot measure in Michigan like California's "Civil Rights Initia-
tive" that ended race-conscious programs in that state.91 The 
Court's decision might fuel a political movement against affirma-
tive action and careful scrutiny of any future Supreme Court 
nominee's views on the controversial subject appears inevitable. 
The protection of a woman's right to choose in Roe v. Wade92 
laid the groundwork for the growth of a strong political move-
ment by anti-abortion activists.93 The same may be true for the 
opponents of affirmative action. Thus, with the Court's decision 
in Grutter and Gratz, the affirmative action battles for the time 
being may shift from the courts to the political arena. 
91. See Kim North Shine, Anti-Affirmative Action Activist Targets Michigan Policy, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 9, 2003; Ward Conncrly, Taking It to Michigan, NAT'L REV., 
July 8, 2003. 
92. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
93. See Rigel C. Oliveri, Crossing the Line: The Political and Moral Baule Over 
Late-Term Abortion, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 397, 397 (1998) (discussing galvanizing 
impact of Court's decision in Roe v. Wade resulting in political battles for years over 
.th)rtion); see also William E. Nelson, Emulating the Marshall Court: The Applicability of 
the Rule of Law to Contemporary Constitutional Adjudication, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 489, 
505-07 (1982) (faulting Court for provoking political controversy by offering rationale in 
Roe v. Wade that did not square with a societal consensus on abortion). 
